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Date Responded 07 March 2019

Provision of information held by Northumbria Police made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the 'Act')

As you may be aware the purpose of the Act is to allow a general right of access to information held at the time of a request, by a Public Authority (including the Police), subject to certain limitations and exemptions.

You asked:

 

1a. Please note the total number of arrests made by the force in the last complete recording year.

1b. Please provide a breakdown of the results of these arrests in the manner these results are recorded by the force. I anticipate this may include successful convictions, unsuccessful prosecutions, and NFAs.

2a. Please inform me whether the force uses any private sector supplied facial recognition solution(s), and in what capacity.

2b. Please inform me of the name of the vendor(s), and contract details, including cost and length of time the contract(s) run(s) for.

3a. Finally, please may you inform me of the total number of arrests made after using the facial recognition solution during the last complete recording year.

3b. As per request 2b please provide a breakdown of the results of these arrests.

In Response:

1a. 30837.

1b.

Bail / Released Under Investigation

495

Caution

1792

Charge/Summons

11995

NFA

10002

Other

5034

Penalty Notice

1502

TIC

17

 

 

With regards to points 2 and 3 - overt use.

No information held. We do not use Facial Recognition overtly

With regards to points 2 and 3 - covert use, we shall neither confirm nor deny any information is held at this point and by doing so rely on the below exemptions.

Section 23(5) Information supplied by or concerning, certain Security Bodies;

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to evidence the harm or articulate public interest considerations to the applicant.

Section 31(3)  Law Enforcement.

Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large.  Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information relating to the covert practise of facial recognition would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities.  Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of covert facial recognition would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement.  This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored.  It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable.  Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006, June and July 2007, and more recently in May and June this year following the Manchester and London terrorist attacks, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’.   The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current threat level is set at ‘severe’.

It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour.  It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means. 

Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert use of facial recognition technology would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorist would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them.  It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.  This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies.  In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed.  This can be use information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations.  Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

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